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As of 2017, 65 million people worldwide had been forcibly displaced by war 
and political violence. Several millions more have fled because of environ-
mental disasters and socio-economic marginalisation. As there is no imme-
diate end in sight to this steadily increasing global trend, forced migration 
is one of the central challenges in world politics today – and it is very likely 
to remain so in the near to medium-term future.
 •  Only a small (albeit increasing) proportion of forced migrants have managed 
to come to the Global North. The main flows take place within and between 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. A focus on South–South dis-
placement thus represents not only a more pluralistic, but also a more accurate 
picture of global forced-migration trends. 
 •  The most visible drivers of forced migration are war and political violence. 
While Syria stands out in this regard, the country also shows that conflict-in-
duced displacement is often intertwined with forced migration resulting from 
environmental disasters and the adverse effects of development projects. 
 •  Disaster-induced displacement denotes population movements in the wake 
of global environmental change, including fast-onset events such as floods, 
storms, or fires, and slow-onset events, such as droughts, land degradation, 
and sea-level rise. With its low-elevation islands, the Pacific region of Oceania 
is particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels.
 •  Development-induced displacement results from socio-economic exclusion as a 
result of large-scale infrastructure projects, mining, deforestation, urbanisation, 
and biosphere projects. The case of India underlines that many development-
induced forced migrants are typically internally displaced. 
Policy Implications
As forced migration continues to occur mostly within the Global South, it is neces-
sary to better understand its causes, dynamics, and effects in Africa, Asia,  Latin 
America, and the Middle East in their own right – and not primarily or even 
exclusively in terms of the implications for the Global North. Also, when drafting 
policy responses to forced migration, a holistic understanding of the complex 
interlinkages between conflict-, disaster-, and development-induced drivers and 
dynamics precludes one-size-fits-all approaches.
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The Global Relevance of Forced Migration: Temporal and Spatial 
Aspects
According to the united Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (uNHCR), the 
number of people forcibly displaced by violence and political persecution worldwide 
currently stands at 65 million. [1]  An additional average of 22.5 million people have 
been internally displaced by environmental disasters each year since 2008 (IDMC 
2018:2). On top of this, an unknown number of people are being displaced every 
year by the adverse effects of development projects; the most often cited  number 
for this is 15 million annually, but this is a rough, likely conservative estimate 
(IDMC 2018:54).
In general, it is safe to say that there has been a clear upward trend of forced 
migration around the globe over the last quarter of a century. As Figure 1 high-
lights, a particularly strong rise can be detected over approximately the last decade, 
starting in the years 2006/07, when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq experienced 
massive escalations in levels of violence, forcing many hundreds of thousands of 
people to flee their homes. Since the years 2012/13, the number of forced migrants 
around the globe has grown even more, partly as a result of the violent conflicts in 
the Middle East and in different subregions of Africa. In both time periods,  drastic 
environmental disasters and the detrimental effects of large-scale development 
projects have further contributed to increasing forced migration. While environ-
mentally induced displacement has received quite a bit of attention in recent years, 
the scale and relevance of development-induced mobility is only gradually seeping 
into academic and policy debates, which is reflected in a severe lack of reliable, longitu-
dinal global data. Figure 1 below is based on uNHCR data and shows internal and 
international, predominantly conflict-induced displacement. 
As Figure 1 indicates, for conflict-induced forced migration the largest group com-
prises internally displaced persons (IDP) – that is, people who had to flee their 
homes but stayed within their country of origin. This trend also holds when taking 
into account disaster- and development-induced displacement. Rather often, IDPs 
find themselves in a dilemma, as the political entity responsible for their protection 
is also that which caused their displacement in the first place. Often more visible 
are forced migrants who cross at least one state border. Among them, refugees are 
the best documented, due at least in part to the special rights afforded to them by 
Figure 1. 
Global Trends in 
Conflict-Induced 
Forced Migration, 
1990–2016
Source: Authors’ 
 illustration based on 
data provided by the 
UNHCR.
1 In the International 
Organization for Migration 
(IOM) glossary on migra-
tion, forced migration is 
defined as “a migratory 
movement in which an 
element of coercion exists, 
including threats to life and 
livelihood, whether arising 
from natural or man-made 
causes” (IOM 2011: 39). 
On data, see www.unhcr.
org (3 June 2018).
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the Geneva Convention of 1951. The convention defines who can be called a refugee, 
a status that comes with certain rights – for instance, the right to protection by the 
 receiving state and the right not to be deported back to where existential threats 
await (condensed in the principle of non-refoulement). In addition to refugees, 
 asylum seekers, stateless people (people who are deprived of any citizenship rights), 
and returnees (people who have returned to their country of origin) also belong to 
the category of migrants crossing state borders. [2]
Looking at the geographical distribution of refugees and IDPs around the 
globe, it becomes very obvious that forced migration is a phenomenon of the Global 
South. As Figure 2 illustrates, only a relatively small, albeit slightly increasing pro-
portion of refugees worldwide have managed to come to the Global North, mostly to 
 Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. However, the main flows 
of forced  migration take place between and within Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
the  Middle East. An explicit focus on South–South displacement is thus required to 
paint an adequate picture of global forced-migration trends.
When differentiating between refugees and IDPs, more detailed, current trends 
can be detected. As the uNHCR data in Figure 2 shows, the dominant host coun-
tries of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations are located in the vicinity 
of the hotspots of wars and political violence in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, refugees fleeing the violence in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Somalia, and South Sudan temporarily settle in countries such 
as, respectively, Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan. In Asia, people fleeing the war in Af-
ghanistan often live in Pakistan or Iran. And in the Middle East, people fleeing the 
violence and political persecution in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen currently reside 
 
2 Given the lack of reliable 
global data, in Figure 1 
these three groups of 
migrants are assembled 
together as “others.”  
Figure 2. 
Geography of Forced 
Migration Flows, 2016
Source: Authors’  
illustration based on 
data provided by  
UNHCR.
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in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, respectively. Taken together, the large ma-
jority of refugees fleeing their countries of origin settle in neighbouring states – and 
these states are overwhelmingly located in the Global South. This illustrates that 
the global attention economy, which has focused largely on South–North migration 
flows, actually misrepresents the spatial characteristics of global forced-migration 
flows. 
Similar to refugees, Figure 2 also highlights that IDPs can almost exclusively be 
found in the Global South. The highest numbers of IDPs worldwide currently reside 
in Colombia and Syria, each estimated to be home to more than six million IDPs, 
some of whom have been displaced multiple times. More than one million IDPs 
currently live in each Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, ukraine, and many sub-Saharan 
states, among them the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. 
As stated above, the main causes of forced migration globally continue to be 
violent conflict and political persecution, including human rights violations. At the 
same time, there are strong indications that many people have also fled their homes 
because of the effects of global environmental change, among them natural dis-
asters, and because of the adverse consequences of socio-economic development 
projects. For this reason, and with no intention of belittling its global importance, 
we consider an exclusive focus on conflict-induced forced migration to be limit-
ing. In the following, we therefore show that conflict-induced displacement is often 
strongly interlinked with disaster- and development-induced forced migration – 
and vice versa. 
Conflict-Induced Migration in Syria
Syria represents the most prominent case of conflict-induced forced migration 
around the globe in the twenty-first century so far. More than half of the Syrian 
population of circa 21 million has been forcibly displaced since the beginning of 
the conflict in 2011, when anti-regime demonstrations in the context of the Arab 
uprisings were met with massive state repression, quickly transforming localised 
protests into an all-out, internationalised civil war (De Juan and Bank 2015). The 
uNHCR estimates that approximately 6.5 million Syrians have been internally dis-
placed, among them 2.8 million children. In stark contrast to populist assertions of 
an imminent end to the fighting in Syria, well over 1.2 million Syrians were forcibly 
displaced within their own country in the first five months of 2018 alone, many of 
them for the second or third time. [3] Given the lack of independent reporting from 
within Syria, we still know far too little about the concrete livelihood situations and 
survival strategies of the millions of IDPs in the different parts of Syria, as well as of 
their typical domestic flight routes and migration patterns. 
Alongside the many IDPs, the often most visibly suffering Syrians have been the 
ones who have managed to flee the violence and leave their country of origin since 
2011. The uNHCR puts the current number of Syrian refugees at circa 5.7 million 
(latest figure: 24 May 2018). [4] Most of the Syrians have resided and continue to 
reside in neighbouring states in the following approximate numbers: 3.6 million in 
Turkey, 987,000 in Lebanon, 666,000 in Jordan, 250,000 in Iraq, and 129,000 in 
Egypt. In absolute terms, the millions of Syrians residing in Turkey make the latter 
the country hosting the most refugees in the world today. In relative terms, Leba-
3 See www.unhcr.org/sy/
internally-displaced-people 
(3 June 2018).
4 See http://data2.unhcr.
org/en/situations/syria 
(3 June 2018)..
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non hosts the most refugees in relation to its populace, as Syrians make up between 
one-fourth and one-fifth of Lebanon’s total population today. In Jordan, the influx of 
Syrians since 2011 has occurred in a country that had already received hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from the region, most notably Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, 
and Iraqis in the 1980s, early 1990s, and the first decade of the 2000s (Bank 2016). 
In fact, Syria itself had been “both a refuge state and a refugee-producing na-
tion” before the beginning of the war in 2011 (Chatty 2017: 25). Syrians have regu-
larly hosted and accommodated massive influxes of forced migrants in their modern 
history, ranging from inhabitants of the Czarist Russian and Ottoman Empires, in-
cluding Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrian Christians, to Palestinians post-1948 and 
post-1967, Lebanese from 1975 to 1989 and in 2006, and Iraqis in the first  decade 
of the new millennium (Chatty 2017:25–27). At the same time, Syrians have for sev-
eral decades been leaving their home country, some permanently – for instance, to 
Europe and Latin America – and some temporarily – for instance, to  neighbouring 
Lebanon and other more affluent, resource-rich Arab states as labour migrants. 
But Syrians have not only crossed the state border, they have also migrated 
inside their country of origin on a large scale. Since independence in 1946, there 
has been a constant development-induced migration from the rural countryside to 
the cities, both to provincial centres, such as Dar‘a in the South and Deir az-Zor and 
Raqqa in the East, and to the central economic hubs of Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, 
and Hama. These demographic shifts have been reinforced and partly guided by 
deliberate resettlement policies initiated by the authoritarian Ba‘thist regime since 
the 1960s that have, for instance, led to the emergence of strong Arab-Syrian settle-
ments in Kurdish-dominated regions of the Northeast as well as to the forced dis-
possession and expulsion of the latter – very much in line with the regime’s Arab-
nationalist agenda.  
Beyond such development-induced forms of (forced) migration, drastic envi-
ronmental changes have also had strong effects on migration patterns inside Syria. 
In the current era, the massive drought period from 2006 to 2009 led hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians to leave their homes in the Northeast of the country, the so-
called “Jazeera” (Arabic for “island”), and to resettle in the agglomerations of and 
countryside around the larger cities further west, from central Homs to Damascus 
and southern Dar‘a. While it is still a matter of debate to what extent this particular 
type of forced migration in Syria was climate/disaster-induced or development-in-
duced, there are strong indications that Syrian state mismanagement was crucial in 
aggravating the situation for the farmers and peasants in the Northeast, ultimately 
contributing to their decision to flee (Fröhlich 2016). Also, the drought affected 
parts of Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan around the same time – in the Iraqi case even 
more severely – but a comparable internal displacement happened only in Syria. As 
interviews with drought-affected Syrian families have shown, the IDPs from 2006 
to 2009 did not play a central role in the Syrian uprising of 2011 or the ensuing war, 
thereby dispelling alarmist accounts of an imminent Syrian “climate war” (Selby et 
al. 2017; Fröhlich 2016). 
While disaster-induced factors certainly have not been decisive for the massive 
forced migration from and within Syria post-2011, they have definitely contributed 
to reshaping Syrian societal dynamics in the twenty-first century. And while forced 
migration of Syrians in recent years is, without a doubt, primarily conflict-induced, 
development-related factors intersecting with the war constellation also need to 
be taken into account. For a number of Syrians that we interviewed in Jordan and 
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 Turkey, the drastically increased cost of living in their home country, the very re-
stricted access to basic services in most of the country, and the rampant corruption 
on all levels were also crucial factors in their decision to leave their homes. [5] Here, 
conflict-induced and development-induced triggers of migration go hand in hand. 
We hypothesise that these dynamics will likely not go away even if the violence were 
to substantially decline with pro-regime forces militarily gaining the upper hand 
and conquering even more territory. The reason for this is that any kind of state-
centred political and economic reconstruction in Syria will likely profit pro-regime 
allies, to the detriment of broad swathes of the country’s remaining and potentially 
returning civil population, conceivably causing even more forced migration in the 
future. 
Disaster-Induced Migration in Oceania
Disaster-induced migration denotes population movements in the wake of global 
environmental change, including both fast-onset events such as floods, storms, or 
fires, and slow-onset events such as droughts, land degradation, and sea-level rise. 
With its low-elevation island nations, the Pacific region is particularly vulnerable 
to certain environmental changes. All regional states are expected to suffer from 
the effects of climate change, but the small atoll countries of Kiribati, the Marshall 
 Islands, Tokelau, and Tuvalu are considered particularly vulnerable. While the heav-
ily populated areas in the capitals of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, 
and Vanuatu are also endangered, the region’s bigger states possess higher-altitude 
territories to which people can move if necessary. On larger islands in particular, 
most migration is therefore expected to be temporary and internal, rural-to-urban, 
and from lower, coastal areas to higher altitudes, especially when environmental 
events are short-term. Longer-term and potentially irreversible processes such as 
sea-level rise or the destruction of fresh-water resources through salinisation, how-
ever, require long-term solutions, which seem to require international resettlement 
to at least some extent.
Even under an optimistic climate scenario, the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) will become partly inhabitable; in a pessimistic one, they will vanish com-
pletely due to rising sea levels (Barnett and Campbell 2010). [6] Their populations 
will therefore inevitably experience moderate to total displacement. The SIDS are 
threatened in three ways: first, in terms of physical availability of land; second, in 
terms of food production and commercial activities; and third, in terms of health 
risks and general habitability. In light of these threats, proactive plans have been 
made, such as the government of Kiribati’s purchasing of land on Vanua Levu Island, 
Fiji, in order to support agricultural as well as fisheries development, which also in-
cludes the option of using the land to resettle Kiribati’s population. Other examples 
include Vunidogoloa Village in Fiji, the residents of which chose to relocate in early 
2014 in order to reduce their vulnerability to the encroaching sea level and floods, 
and the so far futile attempts of Carteret Islands inhabitants to resettle on Bougain-
ville Island. The most concrete plan is the climate-migration strategy developed by 
the former government of Kiribati under President Anote Tong (2003–2016). It 
includes regional migration programmes, plans for community relocation to Fiji, 
and an education campaign, all under the motto “migrate with dignity” (Klepp and 
6 Altogether 65 million 
people are living on SIDS.
5 Interviews with Syrians 
in the Azraq and Zaatari 
refugee camps as well 
as in the cities of Mafraq, 
Irbid, and Ramtha, all 
in Jordan, from 2014 to 
2016, as well as in Istanbul 
in 2016.
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Herbeck 2016) – all aimed to avoid a scenario whereby the people of Kiribati be-
come refugees. 
It is important to note here that despite Northern alarmist debates regarding 
climate change and migration in the Pacific region, many islanders argue against the 
(mis)use of Oceania as an iconographic “warning symbol” for the effects of climate 
change and as an experiment site for Northern researchers, journalists, and actors of 
international cooperation. In the dominant discourse, the island states are depicted 
as isolated, vulnerable, and in need of development, and as small, poor, and not 
equipped for economic growth. Islanders criticise this victimisation and the scan-
dalising image of the effects of climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012), pointing 
out that very little attention has been paid to island inhabitants’ own interpretations 
of climate change, to their agency, and to their potential strategies for responding to 
it (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Importantly, local voices have repeatedly insisted 
that migration is in no way a new practice in Oceania. 
Looking back to precolonial times, Epeli Hau’ofa (1993) has described Oceania 
as a “sea of islands,” where people moved frequently and created social networks, 
traded and exchanged goods, and found new friends, enemies, or partners. As sea 
people, islanders were skilfully voyaging extensive spaces for new settlements, as 
attested in oral tradition and archaeological findings. A similar picture arises from 
more recent history and, indeed, the present: transnational lifestyles abound, and 
relationships are kept alive through remittances and social media. Even for those 
members of the diaspora who cannot afford to go home, their respective heritage 
islands are still central in their spiritual and social practices. This underlines the 
fact that historically, environmental migration has always been an important adap-
tation measure, and that generally, migration is a normal societal process, not an 
exception. On the contrary: migration with the overall goal of improving or gener-
ating livelihoods or of bettering educational and employment opportunities is an 
integral part of regional (and human) history. 
What is more, colonial times saw labour migration and forced relocations. La-
bour mobility led to a distinct demographic reconfiguration of many Pacific Island 
societies in the mid-nineteenth century: blackbirding – the kidnapping of Pacific Is-
landers from their home islands mainly to work on plantations – was a widespread 
practice. Conservative estimates claim that almost one million Pacific Islanders and 
a further half million Asians were affected by the Pacific labour trade between the 
1860s and 1939. Men were recruited for whaling and for plantation development; 
many of them never saw their islands again. In terms of forced relocation, Gliber-
tese (the people of today’s Kiribati) were brought to the Solomons and Fiji, Samoans 
and Solomon Islanders to Fiji. up to 60,000 islanders were working in the sugar 
cane fields in Australia until 1901, when they were deported back to their home-
lands. Another example of forced relocation is the case of Banaba, a part of Kiribati 
mined for phosphate from 1900 until 1980. Today, the centre of the formerly fertile 
island is uninhabitable. Its population was displaced to camps in Nauru, Kosrae, 
and Tarawa by Japanese forces in 1942 and was then relocated to Rabi Island, Fiji, 
by the colonial government in 1945. 
The twentieth century also saw mass migration of Pacific Islanders. New Zea-
land has accepted large numbers of labour migrants from the Cook Islands and 
Samoa. The united States took over the territories that were administered by Japan 
prior to World War II, leading to larger communities of people from the region 
living in the united States today. Furthermore, the most common migration move-
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ments in the region today are from rural areas and outer islands to metropolitan 
zones; this is mostly for reasons of education and health. 
Such activities and movements point to alternative ways of framing the rela-
tionship between global warming and human mobility in the Pacific that can help 
to reorient the debate. For this, the victimising, passive image of the “drowning 
climate-change migrant” as well as the continuing securitisation of climate change 
and related human mobility need to be called into question. Instead, “migration-
friendly” policies should be developed that focus on human rights and citizens’ dignity 
in affected states, and which allow for migrants’ self-determination.
Development-Induced Migration in India
Development-induced migrants are those who have to abandon their homes due to, 
for instance, large-scale infrastructure projects, mining, deforestation, urbanisa-
tion, or biosphere projects. Most of them are internally displaced, which means that 
the entity responsible for their protection is also often the one causing their dis-
placement and that data is difficult to come by, as internal displacement is usually 
not systematically surveyed. The most often cited number is 15 million displaced 
globally per year. 
As Walicki and Swain (2016:8) write, “the impacts on the lives of people driven 
from their homes or land by such ventures can be just as severe in terms of scope 
and duration as those experienced by people displaced by conflict, violence and 
disasters.” It is important to note that contrary to the commonly declared purpose 
of development projects, inequality is often exacerbated by pushing predominantly 
those people from their homes who are already poor or marginalised. The key issue 
is the process of land acquisition in preparation for development projects, which 
can be complex, opaque, and protracted. This process entails partial or full dispos-
session, which may lead to displacement. Sometimes, even rumours of a project can 
initiate dislocation; more “official” pathways are eviction threats or notifications, 
cuts in available services, the destruction of homes, or the beginning of construc-
tion. Such displacement may also go beyond the expropriated area, as development 
projects can alter the ecosystem through pollution or resource redistribution and 
 overuse, making the neighbouring areas inhabitable. Displacement due to devel-
opment projects can thus lead to a downward spiral of marginalisation: it often 
exacerbates poverty, which then tends to become protracted, as IDPs lose access 
to adequate housing, land, food, water, health, and education. The results include 
soaring numbers of homelessness, unemployment, food insecurity, and morbidity. 
The regions most affected are commonly underdeveloped but rich in  resources, 
with appealingly low land prices and little political costs associated with  repurposing 
the land, as populations living in such areas are often indigenous, with little access 
to political representation and economic success to begin with. One example of this 
kind of displacement is India, which has one of the highest numbers of development-
induced IDPs in the world. This is by no means new: development-induced disloca-
tion first became a large-scale trend under British rule, with an estimated 35 million 
displaced (Dadabhai 1988). The 1894 Land Acquisition Act then made the colonial 
state the owner of all biodiversity, natural resources, and land without individual 
titles, thereby laying the ground for further displacements by giving the right to 
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define public purpose and control land use to the state and the state alone. [7]  This 
politics persisted after India gained independence in 1947, as the new nation was 
trying to kick-start its nascent economy; economic reforms in line with the develop-
ment paradigms promoted by liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation further 
exacerbated this trend throughout the decades leading up to the present. All parts 
of the country have been affected, and approximately 90 per cent of displacements 
have been caused by state-run projects (Chakravorty 2016). The government either 
forcibly expropriates forest, private, or common land for what it deems in the public 
interest, or it reclassifies forest and common land – for instance, to create national 
parks. By 2011, India had diverted more than 6.5 million hectares of land to public-
interest projects in the fields of agribusiness, infrastructure, resource extraction, 
and renewable-energy sectors (Walicki and Swain 2016: 16).
Those affected by such decisions have at best received some money to rebuild 
their lives, but until very recently, there were no regulations obligating the state 
to resettle or rehabilitate them. As discontent and protests continued over several 
 decades, some practices of compensating, resettling, and rehabilitating affected 
communities have developed; however, these are unofficial practices rather than 
official policies, so there is no way to enforce them with due process. 
India is planning to continue with major development projects in the fields of 
agrifuel, infrastructure, resource extraction, and renewable energies, which will re-
quire an estimated 11 million hectares of land. An envisaged 100 so-called “smart 
cities” will require even further land and resettlement, as will large dam projects, 
which may be needed to provide sufficient and reliable water resources – it seems 
that development-induced displacement is set to continue. 
Nevertheless, development-induced displacement is by no means the only form 
of displacement in India. War, conflict, and human rights abuses have also produced 
forced internal migrants. Data is hard to come by, as the country lacks central insti-
tutions to coordinate data from federal and state governments. Apart from develop-
ment-induced displacement, India is also experiencing four other kinds of displace-
ment: first, displacement for political reasons, including secessionist movements 
(for instance, in Assam and Nagaland); second, displacement due to identity-based 
autonomy movements (such as in Punjab and Western Assam); third, displacement 
caused by localised violence (for instance, in caste disputes in uttar Pradesh or in 
religiously motivated urban riots in Bombay, Bhagalpur, and Aligarh); and fourth, 
environmental displacement (for instance, after floods, cyclones, and landslides). 
Reorienting the Debate on Forced Migration
It was the “summer of migration” in 2015 that put the issue of forced  displacement 
and immigration centre-stage in political and societal discussions in Europe in gen-
eral and in Germany in particular. With hundreds of thousands of suffering people 
crossing the dangerous migration routes across and along the Mediterranean and 
making their way up north (and thousands dying on the journey), forced migration 
became an issue in the domestic politics of those countries that were temporarily 
hosting larger numbers of forced migrants, such as Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Sweden, as well as those loudly opposed to in-migration, such as Austria, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary. In addition to the often alarmist tones, 
7 This law was overturned 
only in 2013 with the Right 
to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Ac-
quisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, aiming 
to end the earlier practices 
of coerced land acquisition 
and dispossession without 
compensation.
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these political and societal debates were characterised by two obvious biases from 
the perspective of global forced-migration trends: a Northern bias and a conflict bias. 
To reorient the debate around a more accurate picture of global forced-migra-
tion trends, it is thus important to highlight that forced migration has happened 
and continues to do so predominantly within the Global South. There is thus a need 
to understand the causes, dynamics, and effects of forced migration within and be-
tween Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East in their own right – and not 
primarily or even exclusively in terms of the implications for the Global North. A 
deeper understanding of South–South flows in the context of both globalisation and 
North–South relationships is required to avoid reifying the epistemic dominance 
of Northern perspectives on forced migration, and to engage with the historical ex-
periences and empirical realities in the South, which is a key feature of the GIGA’s 
approach to scholarship (Narlikar 2016:2).
Furthermore, there is a need to move away from the exclusive focus on violent 
conflict and political persecution as the only causes of forced migration around the 
globe. While conflict-induced forced migration continues to be centrally important, 
as the case of Syria shows, other drivers are gaining in relevance. The effects of 
global environmental change as well as the adverse effects of development projects 
are two central factors that need to be taken more thoroughly into consideration – 
in fact, this is a prerequisite for sustainable and effective migration policies.  
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